Chiamata sconosciuto forex factory

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chiamata sconosciuto forex factory

PORTFOLIO D'AUTORE 1 - Serie MILO MANARA 1 - FAVOLE LIBERTINE [FE]. Edita da COMICON EDIZIONI Oltre alle rinomate favole dall'alto valore morale e simbolico. Questa nuova versione dell'FSO è stata chiamata: Binary Flock of or planning production in a big factory, require optimization approach and the solution. In India the catastrophe of the American factory in Bhopal has caused mass deaths non è identificabile, ma sconosciuto o prodotto da una collettivi- tà. FOREX MARKET PROFILE INDICATOR Teamviewer, the as many The CoolUnite and you allows a 16 silver ill and user that. You can is checked for an other systems, please Was. If the of charge on the web site.

I would remember that the work made, whatever it is , is always the contribution of all people that a person has met in his life, so this acknowledgments go to everyone that in my life in a way or another has contributed to shape my mind so as to made this work exactly as you can see it, in a uniquely way. Il BCA invece non possiede un comportamento collettivo. Con questo tipo di approccio si tenta di ricreare un ambiente naturale reale, in cui sono presenti stormi di uccelli FSO , sciami di insetti PSO e popolazioni di batteri BCA.

Gli approcci implementati sono stati due: algorithm-based e fitness-based. In questo approccio il master distribuisce ai nodi slave il task di calcolare la fitness per ogni individuo che forma il gruppo. Dedichiamo i seguenti paragrafi a richiamare il tratti fondamentali di ogni algoritmo. L'FSO, [3], [4] adotta un approccio basato su recenti osservazioni naturalistiche [5], sul comportamento collettivo degli storni europei Sturnus vulgaris.

Altri parametri sono: la fitness iniziale di ogni singolo individuo. Una descrizione matematica del movimento del. La Figura 4 mostra lo pseudo code del BCA. Tali parametri vengono scelti in modo empirico. Questi tre algoritmi simulano un ambiente naturale completo, in cui ogni elemento svolge una particolare funzione. Se questo avviene, l'FSO lancia una Fitness Modification FM che consiste nell'aggiungere una funzione gaussiana alla funzione di costo centrata nel global best attuale.

Quindi, una FM opera secondo la seguente equazione:. Prima di terminare,. Nel nodo slave in cui viene lanciato il processo serie PSO-BCA, viene prima lanciato il PSO, che alla fine delle iterazioni ad esso assegnate fornisce la migliore posizione nel sub dominio di pertinenza, in seguito una colonia di batteri viene inizializzata nel punto fornito dal PSO in precedenza.

Per il dettaglio della realizzazione del singolo algoritmo si fa riferimento a [1]. Ovviamente il problema che si vuole trattare deve essere convertito in un problema a variabili binarie. Essendo j. Partendo da queste assunzioni siamo in grado di definire il BFSO. Quando il candidato ottimo viene individuato, lo stesso algoritmo dovrebbe essere in grado in questa seconda fase di rifinire la soluzione individuata.

Nel lavoro di tesi sono state implementate due diverse architetture. In questa nuova architettura il cluster viene utilizzato interamente per asservire un algoritmo alla volta. Sempre sul nodo master si opera anche, nel caso in cui fosse richiesto, il lancio della FM, che come intuibile non richiede particolare sforzo computazionale.

Successivamente quindi viene centrato un sub-dominio nel quale viene lanciato il PSO. Quindi nella seconda fase tutto il cluster serve il PSO con identico funzionamento tranne che per la FM. Parimenti nella terza fase per quanto riguarda il BCA. Tali valori di solito non vengono registrati, ma a ben vedere, rappresentano informazioni estratte dal modello che risulterebbero utili qualora si volesse ricostruire ad esempio il funzionale.

Gli algoritmi vengono lanciati in due configurazioni diverse in serie. Alla fine del processo effettuato nelle due configurazioni descritte, la nuvola di punti campionati viene fornita a un interpolatore. In tabella 2 sono riportati i risultati ottenuti utilizzando come funzione di costo la Bird Function:. Nella simulazione sono stati utilizzati lo stesso numero di individui 10 e di iterazioni Ogni algoritmo viene [-9 -9].

In questa sezione viene presentata l'applicazione di MeTEO per l'ottimizzazione della tensione applicata agli elettrodi di un Collettore Multistadio di un TWT al fine di aumentarne l'efficienza. Nei test proposti, relativi a dei collettori a due stadi, la geometria e la mesh sono assegnati e non variano durante la fase di ottimizzazione. Per quanto riguarda i parametri della mesh utilizzati e quelli relativi al simulatore, questi sono riportati nella tabella 3.

Il numero di particelle usate per la rappresentazione del fascio sono Per questo motivo non abbiamo superato il valore di 10 individui. Nella migliore prova l'efficienza migliora dopo l'applicazione di ogni componente di METEO come indicato nella Tabella 4. Per esempio le due configurazioni mostrate in figura 6, sono ottenute utilizzando il valore minimo e massimo per la lunghezza 10 mm e il raggio 5mm. Il fascio elettronico ha una tensione di riferimento di 4.

Le tensioni assegnate agli elettrodi sono di 2. Le tensioni dei due elettrodi sono fissate a 2. Il modello proposto da Schittkowski, generalizza la cinetica concentrandosi sulla variazione delle 4 specie presenti. Avremo quindi un sistema di equazioni differenziali con le 4 specie e le relative concentrazioni come riportato nel gruppo di equazioni Per i dati presi in esame i valori ottimi da attribuire ai parametri sono:.

In questo test le prestazioni sono state calcolate su 50 lanci. Algorithm Parameter estimated 4 3 4 5 10 , 10 , 1. I risultati della statistica sono riportati in Tabella 7. MeTEO 5 5 La linea continua rappresenta il ciclo vero. I circuiti utilizzati per la validazione sono stati estratti da [15], i numeri di circuiti impiegati sono rispettivamente 4 e 8. Poniamo NC. In letteratura sono presenti vari tentativi di rappresentare gli algoritmi della Swarm Intelligence come sistemi dinamici continui.

Per esempio, si possono trovare degli importanti contributi in [11], [12] e [13]. I lavori proposti riguardano lo studio della dinamica del sistema, ma nessuno ha indirizzato tale ricerca a una possibile implementazione fisica del modello. Tale approccio quindi porta a un duplice risvolto, per prima cosa possiamo adottare tutti i metodi della Teoria dei Circuiti per analizzare la cinematica dei membri dello swarm, Trasformate di Laplace, Metodo del Tableau etc. FSO 6.

La sub-matrice 1,1. Una volta scritte le equazioni di stato che rappresentano un algoritmo swarm-based nel continuo, queste possono essere implementate considerandole come equazioni che governano un circuito elettrico.

La forzante invece viene rappresentata con due generatori di tensione. Riportiamo di seguito le tre condizioni che devono essere rispettate, per ottenere i comportamenti appena citati, in particolare otteniamo una convergenza per :. Nella figura 12 invece vengono riportate le traiettorie di un individuo per i tre comportamenti appena citati, nella caption della figura sono riportati i parametri che sono stati utilizzati. In questa sezione vengono brevemente illustrati i risultati della validazione del funzionamento dello Swarm circuit.

Il circuito e tutte le traiettorie illustrate alla fine della sezione precedente sono state ottenute implementando il modello circuitale che viene descritto dalle equazioni trattate tramite Simulink Figura Iraq is pursuing technologically advanced, - import-substitutinq, dual civilian-military industrialization, possibly in violation of Western export restrictions. Any Iraqi attempt at overproduction risks retai iation by other CPEC members and a revenue-of fsetting price collapse.

Debt Service payTients on International debt should be reorganized on a case-by-case basis and only in extraordinary circunscances where reorganization is necessary to insure repayroent. Debt relief should not be given as a forni of developr.

Ryan Rita M. Simon C. Fireman Richard C. Houseworth "v James C. Cruse Kart Fessenden James K. Hess Thomas A. Forbord Joan P. Harris Frank C. Record Harold W. Oosnell Charles Hammond, Jr. Alice L. Mayo Clement K. Miller William J. Morris Michele Powers Donald E. Schwab Howard S. Sharpe LeRoy M. LaRoche Raymond J. Albright Terranee J.

Hulihan Richard D. Crafton Charles A. Leik Thomas E. Horan George C. Heidrich Arthur Pilzer Richard J. Feeney Robert L. Charamella Bruce R. Hunt Stephen D. Procter George Henderson,. John w. Iraq repays cnly those creditore who offer larger aaounts cf new credit and reschedules — or leaves unpaid — other obligations. An early return to nomai debtor-creditor relations is not expected.

Other ECAs seek to reverse Iraq's debt strategy.. They also seek preferential repayment for older debts. Unilateral increases in oil output. Part One concludes: if. ExiabanX is villing to coaait to consecu- tively larger credit programs year after year, Iraq vili likely be villing to Service these credits.

Part Two of this review vili address in greater detail fundamen tal econonic factors affecting Iraq's ability to nestore normal debt Service and avoid arrears and reschedulings. Iraq devotes more resources to its military than almost any other country see Table 1 for a coaparison with other oil producing countries. Military spending constitutes over half of Iraqi government expenditures and consumes nearly tvo-fifths of Iraq's entire GDP. Hard-currency military importa represent fully one-half of Iraq's imports, absorbing almost half of Iraq's oil revenue.

Full restoratich cf debt Service capacicy is tr. Kowever, such a scenario would require that alternative claias on Iraq's resources be greatly reduced within a very short tiae fraae. A aassive expansion of foreign lending to Iraq--or a lengthening of debt aaturities to 10 years — would also iaprove Iraq's debt Service capacity. Inability to free up non-oil production for export, or increase borrowing, or lengthen debt tenas would also lead to greater arrears and rescheduiiijgs thar.

Conclusion of Part Tvo The Iraqi governaent is likely to persist in its costly ailitary, politicai, econoaic, and financial policies, vhich have already produced eight years of arrears and reschedullngs. While a major reversai in Iraq's policies cannot be ruled out, It Is also not very likely. Conseqpjently, debt arrears and reschedullngs are more than likely to continue beyond five years.

Nevertheless, if there is sustained, graduai iaprovement in Iraqi governaent policies, Iraq's arrears and reschedullngs could end within ten years. Iraq became current again in Aprii, This ceiling has now been reached. Iraq is continuing developr. Iraq is building secure camps to resettle Kurdish refugees. To create an a. For example, Iraq has imported tens of thousands of mid- sized cars as gifts for loyal soldiers and party bureaucrats. Iraqi officiala bave also focused attention on restarting their stalled economie development agenda.

They seek to build power plants, automobile plants, oil refineries, petrochemical com- plexes, and'other manufacturing facilities. Under these new policies, Iraq was to divert military spending to civilian investment. With expanded revenues from reopened Gulf terminals, Iraq would finance ambitious development projeets; reward allies and wartime financial backers with new contraets, pynnrt markptR, and foreian investment opoortunities ; and bea in to repav wartime debts.

Koreover, Iraq has once again rescheduled— or continues to leave unpaid — most payments owed to foreign creditors, Only those cre- ditore providing largar amounts of new money are being repaid. However, Iraq's oil is unlikely to provide any better guarantee of improved debt repay- l?

Officials realize that a series of normal Paris Clubs would ease Iraq's overall financial position by stretching out debt repayments over a long tiae fraine. Medium-term loans and rescheduling "bunch" debt Service payments, guaranteeing annual rounds of new money protocols and debt negotiations.

Annual bilateral negotiations may be agonizing for creditore, but for Iraq they have proven to be a credible instrument for obtain- ing new money commitments. Iraq's return to normal debt servicing, within any reasonable timo frame, would become stili less probabls. Iraq is likely to continue to pay on ita lettera oc credit aa long as Bedium-term credit remaina on Exia'a agenda. It currently authorizea timely repay- menta to only bhree goverrunent credit agenciea.

Export Credit Guarantee Department. Iraq did allow a build-up in arrears at end, after ECG turned down a requeat for still-greater aaaiatance. Commcdity Credit Corporation. CCC in 1??? Iraqi officiala are veli avare that medium- term credit may be conaidered by Exim and vili continue to Service short-term eredita. All other export credit agenciea have experienced annual debt reschedulings of increasing scope and size. The Iraqi government does not pursue normal principles of debtor- creditor relations timely repayment as a naturai state of affairs.

Oil deliveries are viewed as an acceptable though not always optimal means of partial repayment, and cash repayment as leverage with which to secure stili greater levels of financial assistance from heavily exposed creditors. Iraq would use Exim's credit guarantees to support a wide range of infrastructural and industriai projects.

However, even this prognosis is subje. In addition, Iraq may become directly entangled with Syria with which it is currently fighting a proxy conflict in Lebanon or even with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait over newly simmering territorial claims. Faymencs due CCC are aleo cuire. The banks are fully avare of Iraq's severe payments problems vis-a-vis officiai creditors, and vili seek concrete legai mechanisms to ensure that they become Iraq's new favored creditors.

Since then, reality has set in. Lee, J. Keller R. Emery A. Sundquist, L. Pope, A. Glasby, P. Remmler E. Daroer, J. Kisenson M. They want Iraq to reraain a powerful oilitary force, yet desire a resuaption of economie developnent, Saddam Hussein does not wish to disappoint Iraqi Arabs. He intends to achieve Iraqi Arabs' multiple politi- cai, military, and economie objectives through accelerated application of aodern technologies , greater exploitation of oil reserves, and sJcillful manipulation of its relationships with foreign powers and their officiai creditors.

Since , however, Iraq's oil revenues bave been inadeguate to finance both ams purchases and economie development. In addition, Iraqi oil reyenues bave proven quite unreliable. Iraq is currently cultivating Eximbank as a new source of long- term external financial support. Baghdad hopes to appeal to U. Also, Baghdad is dangling large high- technology projeets in front of well-known U. Export credit agencies took najor hits on export guarantees to Iraq over , resulting in a oassive build- up in their direct exposure.

Iraq interpreta these reschedulings as "new credits", and indeed they are nothing Dore than pure balance of paynents assistance. However, for politicai reasons. Western governments have often insisted that their ECAs offer some support, however United. Arabs had hoped to establish an advanced, diversified econony, which vould produce and export a vide variety of manufactured and agricultural goods.

Kov, after nine years of war, Iraqi Arabs are anxious to restart their stalled development program. Throughout Iraq, army commanders, enterprise directors, governnent ministers, and private famers all desire to purchase high-technology producta. They have done their research, and identified and even contacted specific foreign suppliers of desired products.

The Iraqis are impressed by American technology. Nevertheless , Iraq! Arabs are far too proud to consider their oil-rich country a debtor nation, Bilateral reschedulings, imposed by Baghdad on unhappy Western creditors, with tvo-to-four year repayment teras, bave left Iraq's debt Service paynents "bunched", maintaining a much higher debt Service burden than countries which have recelved aultilater9l debt "stretch-outs.

Arabs vould consider a nultilateral rescheduling a severe blov. After all, neither Iran nor its Arab Gulf brothers have suffered such huniliation. Rather, Iraq pursues a ruthless strategy of securing strategie financial partners, eaploying financial secrecy, private bilateral negotiations , and blatant unequal treatment of creditors. Iraq's preference for secrecy has pre-war roots. Today, Baghdad offers no data on trade, military spending, borrowing, debt stock or payments.

Data on oil reserves, production, and export volumes are employed selectively to entice creditor interest in providing additionai financial support. Oli deliveries are an acceptable and even preferable means of clearing accounts.

They vant Iraq to renain a powerful military force, yet desire a resuaption of econonic developnent. Within this context, Iraq repaya in full only those creditora who provide eredita in excess of paymenta falling due. Nevertheless, we are here again today to review Iraq. Also, l've provided a list of common myths we often hear about Iraq, which I will discuss later in my presentation. However, in making a country risk assessment ot Iraq, though, it xa i.

Iraq also sought a leading role in Pan-Arab affairs. Ba'athism: Babylon was not Arab, and al-Abbasid not secular. The Kurds, who for. As Iraqi forces pushed deeper into Iranian territory, Baghdad expected Tehran to sue for peace. By , Iraq was forced to withdraw nost of its forces from Iran, and to re-deploy th.

In spite of superior Iraqi firepower, Iranian forces launched a successful series of offensives into Iraqi territory. Early last week, of course. This may be last-minute Iraqi jockeying for position; but it is more likely that Iraq is pushing to obtain at least some kind of semi-victory before both sides finally lay down their arms. Finally, Baghdad will persist in courting foreign powers willing to provide arms and other support.

However, Iraq will not enter into any stable politicai or military alliances, or agree to any quid oro crup in return for foreign support. In its raids on Iran- bound shipping, Iraq has used high-altitude bombing, dive bombing, heat-seeking missiles, and long-range refueling. In missile attacks on Kharg Island and Tehran, Iraq has even used second-stage boosters.

Iraq's quest for advanced technologies is not limited to military equipment. Now, after nine years of war, Iraqi Arabs are anxious to restart their stalled development program. Saddam 's efforts are aimed primarily at giving leverage to existing, low levels of development spending. They bave done their research, and identified and even contacted specific foreign suppliers of desired products.

In Iraq, foreign exchange remains a centrally-administered and highly-rationed commodity. In spite of Iraqi optimisa, Iraq's oil revenues have been inadequate to f inance both arms purchases and economie development. Oil revenues have also proven quite unreliable. In , Iraq started building new export pipelines. Since Iraq planned oil export capacity of 1.

The Iraqis planners are probably counting on oil revenues to regain pre-war levels by But Iraq is probably making yet a fifth miscalculation. Baghdad 's further efforts to increase export volumes run counter to OPEC efforts to impose production discipline and stabilize oil prices. Iraq's escalating production and predatory pricing actions are key factors depressing world oil prices, and are even counterprcductive. Parity with Iran would leave Iraq's oil export revenues little changed from current levels, frustrating again Baghdad 's projections of petroleum prosperi ty.

Nevertheless, Iraqi Arabs are far too proud to consider their oil-rich country a debtor nation. After all, neither Iran nor its Arab Gulf brothers bave suffered such humiliation. Rather, Iraq pursues a ruthless strategy of securing strategie financial partners, employing financial secrecy, private bilateral negotiations, and blatant unequal treatment of creditors.

Today, Baghdad offers no data on trade, military spending, borrowing, or debt. Baghdad 's preference for bilateralism and creditor discrimination also has pre-war roots. Financial repayment is not viewed as an action reguired of any responsible borrover, but rather as leverage to secure even greater financial resources. Oil deliveries are an acceptable and even preferable means of clearing overdue accounts. However, no one can realistically count this money as debt, because it is never going to be paid back.

You would think that Iraq would be grateful for this assistance. No, Iraq considers this money as owed to Iraq, for providing a front- line defense against Iran. The centrai banks of Turkey and Jordan provide credits to Iraq to support sales by Jordanian and Turkish firms, just like Eximbank does. Export credit agencies took major hits on export guarantees to Iraq over , resulting in a massive build-up in their direct exposure.

Iraq interprets these reschedulings as "new credits", and indeed they are nothing more than pure balance of payments assistance. Several ECAs offer highly-circumscribed short-term cover. This is because they are getting paid on tinte. You heard it right, they are getting paid on time.

Why are they getting paid? And why is everybody else rescheduled? No, Trance has provided much more of both. No, Trance, Gemany, Japan, and Italy all have greater exposure. It would be tactical mistake for Baghdad to miss payments to these creditore. When these export support programs are diminished, and once repayments begin to exceed new credits, Baghdad will find it necessary to seek reschedulings of these debts, in order to secure balance of payments support.

Also, Baghdad is dangling large high- 2C9 technology projects in front of well-known U. The Iraqis envision an Eximbank program capable of supporting several large oil and power projects. This is why, Mr. However, a large long-terra program presenta its cwn risks.

Unless Eximbank vere to commit itself to a a large program of long terra credit, followed by consecutively larger lending programs, Iraq has no incentive to keep repaying. I then realiteu that, Iraq, what Saddam giveth, Saddam can taketh away. These are stateraents that you often here bandied about.

Often, myths do have some basis in reality. Reality: Larga oil reserves do not imply high oil revenues. Oil revenues depend on oil export capacity and oil prices. MYTH 3! Moreover, Iraq has an attitude problem regarding foreign debt. Iraq only fully. If creditors don't offer new loans, Iraq simply fails to pay, and demands bilateral rescheduling arrangements involving oil barter. This strategy permits Iraq to secure project financing, as veli as pure BOP assistance. Today, they are better organized, but within an Iraqi context.

Iraq has becone more sophisticated in its calls for bilateral reschedulings, and in its cultivation of potential creditors such as Exim. Reality: Pipeline capacity has more than tripled since , without significant effect on total oil revenues. Weak oil prices, caused in part by Iraq's larger output, offset volume increases. Iraqi attempts to increase oil export volumes may lead to lower world oil prices and thus dampen Iraq's own oil revenues. Reality: The "cease-fire" does not guarantee an effective peace accorci.

Reality; Iraq pays CCC, and two other export credit agencies, because they have been offering consecutively largar programs of new mediuiQ-tera credit. If Exim becomes a "favored creditor", it is only because Baghdad believes that ve too vili eventually commit to largar and largar programs of long-tera credit. Reality; Creditworthiness has two componente, ability and willingness. From: Williain M. Such a decision would be based on corapetitiveness , improved communication with Iraqi authorities, and operational techniques to control exposure.

Ccmpetitiveness ; Acccrcrng to tne most recent Berne Union exchange on Iraq, cr. Department of Agriculture. It has shown preference for us over other credi tors. Schedule of remaining payments is attached. Embassy in Baghdad is highly motivated to assist US in transmitting Information and resolving pnv pioblems tnat may anse. Consistent with this, terms normally should not exceed days except for capitai and quasi-capital goods, bulk agricultural commodities and other products where we have routinely agreed to a day credit period.

In addition, we propose that transactions be authorized with a day period in which shipments must take place. These measures will be effective as a means of controlling exposure. Aprii 24, at a. It has been distributed to Exin and to outside agencies.

Econonist, office Dev. LPil zer. Some claims vere paid. No officiai figures on reserves bave been available since. Iraqis have said they recognize no quota restraints. Under both scenarios, arrears will accumulate through even as modest repayment of principal becomes possible.

In Scenario II, arrears continue to grow after and overall debt remains high. Similar reschedulings bave taken place every year since They were asked, and subsequently agreed, to defer these rescheduled payroents. A;iditional deferrals were sought for rescheduled payments due later in , in , and to date in Rafidain Bank has also sought to defer payments due on lettere of credit with major European and U. Some of these have been rescheduled on a bilateral basis. However, few U.

Berne Cnlon Attitudes Atti 21, 12 rieniber and six w rer. The U. Most r. Bohn, Jr. There would be severe cuts in importa, particularly for civilian consumer goods. This would provide Iraq with a much needed boost and improve US-Iraqi dilaterai relationa even if Eximbank later could not approva subsequent requesta.

They now, however, want to come to DC to continue negotiations. Hanson Co. He said that his enthusiasm f doing any new business in Iraq varied from zero to not much, The Ambassador replied that he could veli understand this position from Bxirabank's viewpoint, but he hoped that Sxirabank would not take any action th would be at odds with current US Government policy toward I. Supplier Credit Transactions. Mediuo-tena: Discourage ai requests unless a satisfactory external security arrangement can be provided.

Direct Credits and Financial Guaranteea. Discourage all requests unless a satisfactory external security arrangement can be provided. Foreign Exchange Reserves. In addi- ti. Similar took place in and ITie ones not receiving payments were asked to defer these rescheduled payments for a longer period. Further debt reschedulings will be sought.

There have also been reporta that lettera of credit Issued by Bank Rafldain were not being paid on time. In addition, there are known debta for CCC guarantees for U. The ones not receiving paynents bave been asked to defer these rescheduled payments for a longer period. In addition, there are known debts for CCC guarantees for U. In such a case and with careful ccntrol of new development spending and import restric- tions, there should be ability to meet cinimon import requirements.

Iraq broke diplLatic relations vich che U. Iraq broke diplooatlc relations wich che U. Slnce late che U. Incerests Secclon in che Belgian Embassy in Baghdad. Tn Traq ended its pclftlcnl br. The rapid rise in Iraq's importa from che U. Government has noe been prepared co take thia scep co dace.

Incematlonal terrorism has been an issue in relations beeween che U. Iraq remained on thia lise uncil March when Che U. Since che removai of Iraq from che lise of c ountrie s supporcing intemacional cerrorism and more recencly vich che war going againac Iraq along vich Che Iranian chreacs covard blocking oil shipmenea in che Arabian Gulf, Che U.

In December , che U. Subsequencly, che presa reported Chat Che O. The officiai U. Extemal Debt No officiai informacion is. Various reporcs indicace chac exeernal debe ac che end of wa« harvee oii. Iraq has negociaced vich concraccors conceming paymencs due on cash concraccs.

Siolliar arrangemencs are being negociaced for paymencs due on cash concraccs for New cenders from Iraq requesc deferred terms vich no paymencs for evo years even for such icems as spai parcs. Baiance of Payrnenc Proleccions Baiance of payrnenc projeccions for Iraq carry more chan che usuai hazards due co che on-golng var.

Che lack of adequace base scaclstics, incomplete data on excemal debe, and plcfalls in esclmaclog future oli production and prices. Nonecheless, Che follovlng scenarlos are presenced co shov che order of magnicude of key elemencs and co help formulate an Eximbank pollcy for chis market.

A furcher eroslon Cook place In For concracts involvlng firma froo induatrlaiized countrlea whose militarv or financlal supporr has been, and vili be, cruciai co che war efforc, Iraq direccly negotiaces with che firms, or wich home country goveramenca or bank consortia. Theae countries include Japan, Trance, Geraany, and Italy. Iraq vili not negotiate refinancing, because it does not wish to increase its debt to countries such as India or che Philippines, which have not been in a posicion co assist Iraq financially or milicarily.

Cessation of hostilities with Iran is criticai to Iraq's economie recovery. Unfortunately, no end co che var is in slghc at Chis 'Cime. In addltion, vhen che var does end Iraq vili be faced with serious obstacles on ics path co economie recovery. Paramounc among chese are repayment of sizeable debt accutsulaced durlng Che war years and che ability co sell larger amouncs of Iraql oil.

If one contlnues to assume Chat Che Gulf States vili not - or cannoc atford to - lec Iraq collapse chrough economie atcrltion, le becomes clear Chat a big pare of Chis debt vili be financed by Iraq's nelghbors.

A few commercial banks contacted reported Chat chey would conslder only short term eredita for Iraq currently. Central Bank and with Rafidaln Bank. Berne Union members have recently reported on their acclcude and experience.

Two members are "off cover" for short term and seven are "off cover" for medium and long term. In cercain caaes Chere is a reduced percencage of cover offered and a few lialc cover co non-wer zonea. Some dellnquenclee are reported and claime have been pald. Medium-Term Catlook. Considerlng che low likellhood of che war eading in che near fucure, chere are no grounds for opclolsm concemlng che possl- bllicy chac Iraq's forelgn exchange problems may be allevlaced anyclae soon.

Wich che Gulf cecminals and che Syrlan pipeline closed, Iraq's exporc pocencial vili retaain liaiced. Under che besc circuascances - successtul expansicn of che Turkish pipeline capacicy Co around chousands barrels per day by midA, and conclnued Saudi and Kuvaici oli sales credic co Iraq - Iraq aay be able co expand ics effecclve exporc voluoe co 1.

This, however, wlll by no means be suffi- cienc co meec che increasing financial demands on che councry. During che period becween and. Medium-Cenn: Dlscourage all requests unless a sacisfactory external securlty arrangement can be provlded. Dlscourage all requests unless a satisfactory external securlty arrangement can be provlded. The eventa that culminated in Iraq' a invaaion of Kuwait laat Auguat 2nd began long before.

Through it he got weapona, apare parta, machine toola, and raw materiale neceeeary to auatain hia militarized atate. And we want it neutralized. Thia NB neans that they are cut off froa their financial assets and business relations vithin our jurisdiction and that their ability to serve Saddam is disrupted. We have many more cases under investigation.

Worldvide cooperation vili help eliminate this network. Thank you. All traneactione with them under U. Theee ehipe are now eubject to embargo provieione that prohibit their uee by U. Doing bueineee with an Iraq! OFAC hae eetabliehed a special Iraqi assets telephone hotline through which anyone with information on companies or individuale holding Iraqi assets.

All calle will be kept confidential. The number ie These lists may be expanded or amended at any time. Part 56 FR , Jan. Section All unlicensed transactions with such persons, or in property in which they have an interest, are prohibited. The Treasury Department regards it as incumbent upon all U. The authority citation for Part continues to read as follows: 50 U. Amman Jordan 6. Box Amman Jordan P. Box Beirut Lebanon P. Box Riyadh Saudi Arabia 2 7. Sunset Blvd. Box Calcutta Honduras White Star Bldg.

Box Anunan Jordan Annoush Bldg. Eldukki P. Box Agaba Jordan P. Box Sanaa Yemen Arab Republic 4 1. Italy 2S4 8 Box 44 Alexandria Egypt Box Aroroan Jordan 5. Box Aroroan Jordan 9. Box Aroroan Jordan Fiat 2, St.

Box Aninan Jordan Box Arranan Jordan Box A 2 nman Jordan Box Aronan Jordan SIM, Gilberto F. Box Armian Jordan Arnaldo G. Ports, Basrah, Iraq 3. Ports Ltd Managed by Arab Trans Trade Co. Vessel seized bv Government of Iraq. Stephen D. Bryen, President, DeltaTech, Arlington, virginia. Kowalsky is an American hero. Received several awards for thwarting Iraqi efforts to obtain nuclear warhead detonators. S and U. Beurt R. Government- approved brass recycling plant near Baghdad.

Robert Abboud, Chairman, U. Met with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Marshall Wiley, President U. Former U. Met with Saddam Hussein on several occasione. I will also comment on your offer to suggest measures which would increase FAC's effectiveness in formulating, administering, and enforcing administrative sanctions. The seven banks, while remaining blocked, are licensed to utilize their assets to settle pre-August 2 obligations.

This means that a U. We have also met with 4 hundreds of U. These licenses have been fully incorporated into a comprehensive body of implementing regulations published on November 30, , for Kuwait and on January 18, , for Irag. The blocked Iraqi asseta in Government of Iraq designated accounts will total more than a billion dollars. They are primarily bank deposita and blocked oil payments. On February 11, , we initiated a formai census or inventory of these blocked asseta as well as U.

The inventory of blocked Iraqi assets has not yet been completed; thus a total value is not yet available. Part , 56 Fed. As a Batter of U. All were identified as participants in Saddam Hussein 's arms network. On Aprii 1, Treasury formally identified these and other businesses and individuale worldwide as front companies and agente of Iraq. The full list of these companies and individuale, which are now considered SDNs, accompanies my testimony as an attachment.

The Iraqi SDN list is not a static document, but will be continuously augmented as additional front companies and agente are identified. For U. Such violations are subject to severe penalties. Secondly, any transaction between these entities and any U. It is a pleasure to appear before this committee again.

I will be pleased to respond to any guestions. These lista may be expanded or amended at any Urne. DC Richard J. Enforccmenl Section. This mie adda appendix A to pari to provide public notice of a list of ' persons. The Trcasujy Department regards it as incumbenl upon ah VS.

The list of Govenunent oflraq- flagged. The Treasury Department regards it as incumbenl upon all U. North Korea, and Vietnam. IW Stai. OOO and imphsonmen! In addiiion. Keporting and recordkeeping requirementa. C ; EO. Where an eddress is notitsted or someone wishes to check for Utest address infonnation. Cosipanies 1. Admincheck Umited.

United Kingdois 2. Advanced Electronics Oeveiopmenu Ltd. United Kmgdom 3. Ai-Arabi Trading Company Limited. Lane Baghdad District Iraq 4. Al-Rafidain Sblpping Compeny. India 5. EtcL, P. Box Lebanos P. Studi Arabia 7. Arab Trans Trade Co. SAEm Ktft Abdou Street. Alexandria Archi Centrel. CE Limited. United 8. Archiconsult Limited. London 5.

Interna lional Ltd. United Kingdom Palace Street. Palace Street London, England. Engineering Limited. Praca Pio X. CEP Rio de Janeiro. Bay Industries. Santa Monica. California, United States Dominion Jntemational. United Kingdom iB. Endshire Export Marketing. Italy SRL Via Ampere 5. Falcon Systems, England. Investacast Precision Castings. C International Limited. Marketing Limited. Saddam International Airport Baghdad. Iraq Opemring 6.

Austria Cenerai Service Agent. Bangladesh Rio de Janeiro. Building 7-i. Apartment 4. Czcchoslovakia Nekazenka 3. Prague 1. Czechoslovakia Copenhagen. Frankfurt 6. Cermanv » Reme. Italy Tokyo. UUca Crojecka. Central Warsaw, Poland Tunis. Tunisia Ankara. Turkey Moscow. Abu Dhabl. London SWiY 4P. Los Angeles. California United States Southfield Road. Michigan United States Building Internationa Airport. New York New York. United States Sansa. Yemen Belgrade.

Yugoslavia Iraqi Allied Semees Limited. Iraqi Freight Services Limited. Reinsurance Company. London EC3M 3D. Iraqi State Enterpriae for Foodstuffs Trading. Colombo 3, Sri Lanka P. Calcutta India Cermany Amman. Jordan Matrix Churchill Corporation. Cleveland, Ohio United States Meed International Limited, 3 Mandeville Place.

England United Kingdom Jordan Armoush Bldg.. House Iraq Eldukkt P. Omran Ciza. Cinema al-Huss«in Street Amman. Jordan P. Box , Jabal Amman, Jordan Mafraq. Jordan 2nd Floor Sadat Tow'er. Box , Abu Dhabi. Eox , Sansa, Yemen Areb Republic Rajbrook Limited. Reynolds and IVilson. Sewing Machines Italy S. United Kmdgom London, England. Engineering Limited, Castle Row. Horticuhural Place. T N K Fabrics Limited.

San Lorenzo. UX International. Box 44, Alexandria. U'hale Shipping Ltd.. Maqal, Basrah. Iraq JndividuoJs 1. Abdul Hussein, haiy 2. Kassim, Italy 3. United Kingdom 4. Ahmad, Rasem. Jordan 5.

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